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6 Beyond financial value capturing?  
Interactions between value capturing and cooperation at 
the interface of road infrastructure and land use planning 
 
 
Conflicts between infrastructure developers and local residents are not restricted to 
western societies. Developing nations, such as China, have to deal with these issues as 
well. So-called ‘nail houses’ are a phenomenon from Chinese cities that are picked up by 
western media from time to time. China is an example of a nation that places the national 
interest of economic growth above other interests. The interests and rights of individual 
residents seem to receive low priority in these developments. Nevertheless, some 
individual residents resist the plans and construction works when they feel that 
compensation is inadequate. These residents have nothing to gain from the plan. In the 
end, the roads are then simply built around the resisting properties and most of these nail 
houses are eventually demolished. However, despite being taken from a context that is 
quite different, the nail houses illustrate that cooperation and co-production do not work 
under unequal conditions. Cooperation and co-production of plans require that the 
interest positions of all relevant stakeholders are improved sufficiently: a win-win 
situation. 
  




















To deal with tensions between functional interrelatedness and institutional fragmentation, road 
infrastructure planning is increasingly interested in integrated planning approaches. From a value 
capture perspective, integration offers possibilities for financially linking road infrastructure and 
other land uses. Additionally, VC may be expected to have value for the cooperation between 
involved, but often institutionally fragmented actors. This chapter explores the relations between 
the application of different types of VC and cooperation between fragmented actors in planning at 
the infrastructure-land use interface. Our findings point at a positive, reciprocal relationship 
between partnership-based VC types and cooperation among fragmented actors. 
This chapter has been published as:  
Heeres, N., Lenferink, S., Tillema, T. & Arts, J. (2016), ‘Beyond financial value capturing? 
Interactions between value capturing and cooperation at the interface of road 
infrastructure and land use planning’, Town Planning Review, 87(2), 179-204.  




In many countries, integrated planning approaches to road infrastructure works are 
increasingly applied, such as area-oriented planning (the Netherlands), ‘Infrastruktur in 
der Landschaft’ (Germany) or context-sensitive design (US). These approaches aim to deal 
with the tensions between functional interrelatedness of land uses and institutional 
fragmentation of responsible actors (governmental layers, public agencies and, 
increasingly, private actors such as landowners and developers as well; see also Spaans et 
al., 2011). Paying appropriate attention to interrelatedness at the infrastructure-land use 
interface potentially leads to synergies between road network development and regional 
or local land use improvements in an area. These synergies may enhance planning 
efficiency and overall area quality (Amekudzi & Meyer, 2006; Graham & Marvin, 2011; 
Kwakkel & Van der Pas, 2011). From a financial perspective, integration efforts seem 
attractive as property value is expected to increase in areas where infrastructure 
investments are made, due to improved accessibility and area quality. Through value 
capturing (VC), these gains can be recouped and reinvested in public facilities, such as 
infrastructure (Alterman, 2012; Priemus, 2002; Samsura & Van der Krabben, 2012; VROM-
Raad, 2004; RVW, 2004). VC can be understood as regaining increases in private property 
value that occur as the positive externalities of public investments. Examples of VC-
mechanisms are taxation or obligations to invest in public facilities (Whatmore, 1994; 
Healey et al., 1995). The application of VC also fits a trend of decreasing central 
government funding for major infrastructure works. The extent to which the recouped 
funds may be expected to contribute to investments in major road infrastructure works is 
circa 10%-20% (Ruding, 2008; Samsura & Van der Krabben, 2011).  
A precondition for the formulation and realisation of integrated projects is attention to 
institutional fragmentation of actors with responsibilities or roles in spatial planning 
(Baccarini, 1996; Turok, 2001; PBL, 2011; Verhees, 2013). Integration of interests requires 
open cooperation between actors representing interdependent interests. However, often 
these actors are strongly fragmented, e.g. across different spatial scales and with varying 
scopes of interest (Healey, 1998; Martens, 2007; De Jong & Spaans, 2009). A possible 
additional, but important effect of value capturing is improved control of planning and 
decision-making between these fragmented actors (Ruding, 2008). The application of VC 
hypothetically enhances cooperation between the fragmented actors at the interface of 
road infrastructure and other land uses (Rakers et al., 2010; Spaans et al., 2011). For 
example, more level planning arenas could be achieved by using captured values as a 
source of funding for overall spatial quality rather than for reinvestment in infrastructure. 
This could be an incentive for viable cooperation between fragmented stakeholders (see 
e.g. Van der Veen et al., 2010; Spaans et al. 2011; Fischer & Amekudzi. 2011). Nevertheless, 
literature and practice lack a nuanced understanding of the exact relationship between 
cooperation among institutionally fragmented actors and VC.  
In order to fill this gap, this chapter explores the hypothetical relationship between VC 
(three types) and cooperation among the fragmented actors that interact in integrated 
infrastructure-land use developments. More specifically, we provide an analysis of the 
interactions between public and private actors that form the basis for cooperation in three 
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Dutch planning projects at the interface of major infrastructure works and other land uses, 
in which various value capture mechanisms were applied. The Dutch planning system 
has undergone several institutional changes over the past decade. One of these is a 
revision of planning legislation, including improved provisions in public and private law 
for capturing surplus development values (Dutch public law ‘GREX’; De Wolff, 2007). 
This has improved the system’s suitability for the integration of road infrastructure and 
other land uses.  
Problems due to tensions between functional interrelatedness and institutional 
fragmentation are a general concern for infrastructure development in western societies 
and their sustainability goals (Amedkudzi & Meyer, 2006; Neuman, 2006; Hull, 2008). This 
requires a different approach to cooperation. The existence for various mechanisms for 
VC make the Dutch case a relevant case to provide first insights into the facilitation of 
cooperation as a relevant secondary effect of VC applications. 
6.2 Theory 
6.2.1 Cooperation between fragmented actors in integrated infrastructure planning 
approaches 
In order to pay appropriate attention to functional interrelatedness at the infrastructure-
land use interface, it is necessary to deal with institutional fragmentation (Baccarini, 1996). 
Addressing institutional fragmentation involves a shift from hierarchical government to 
open governance coalitions (Healey, 1998; Harding, 1993 in Woltjer, 2000; De Roo et al., 
2001; Cameron et al., 2004). Martens (2007) argues that contemporary governance should 
involve a shift from closed to open governance modes. Closed governance refers to a 
coordinative model, whereas open governance relates to a level playing field in which 
public and private actors can interact to develop policy. Open governance is characterised 
by either competition (interaction by power relations and bargaining) or argumentation 
(interaction by arguments, reasoning and ‘sense-making’ among actors) (Busscher et al., 
2014). Especially the latter one seems relevant in the light the aim to exploit potential 
synergies at the infrastructure-land use interface. 
The first and foremost factor in cooperation between organisations is interdependence 
(Booher & Innes, 2002; Verhees, 2013). Organisations are interdependent when outcomes 
are less readily available through the efforts of individual units than through collective 
effort (Molnar, 1978). Concerning infrastructure-land use integration, interdependence 
should be seen as symbiotic interdependence, a term coined by Alexander (1995). This 
refers to complementary differences and interlocking needs that actors cannot meet 
independently (see also Fenger, 2001). Synergies primarily emerge at the interface of 
symbiotic interests rather than at the interface of competing interests (Tjosvold, 1988). 
Additional factors for cooperation between organisations can be abstracted from 
operational literature on inter-organisational cooperation (Kaats & Opheij, 2012; Galavazi, 
2012). A second factor then is sufficient attention to mutual interests. Knowledge of and 
respect for the aims of other stakeholders in the planning arena are required to transform 
shared goals into integrated projects. Thirdly, as cooperation processes are strongly 
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subject to the contributions of individuals, cooperation must be explicitly regarded as a 
human effort. Fourthly, the institutional structures that form the practical framework for 
cooperation must have the capacities necessary for integrating the specific challenges at 
the infrastructure-land use interface. An example of such capacities can be found in 
Portland (USA), where the Metropolitan Planning Organisation has been generally 
successful in steering spatial development from an integrated perspective, due to its 
position in both urban and transportation planning (Tillema, 2012). Finally, in addition to 
a suitable institutional structure, the management of cooperative processes should also be 
fitted to the integrated objectives. Fitting management is characterised by e.g. a clear idea 
about process control and a coordinated distribution of roles. Such aspects can be 
anchored in administrative agreements. Table 6.1 summarises the outlined parameters for 
cooperation in in planning at infrastructure-land use interface. 
Table 6.1. Parameters for cooperation between fragmented actors at infra-land use 
interface 
Cooperation parameters Role in planning at infrastructure-land use interface 
Interdependent ambitions 
(necessary precondition) 
Symbiotic interdependence between 
complementary ambitions 
Attention to mutual interests Understanding and respect for mutual interests 
Cooperation as a human effort Trust, constructive group dynamics, and unifying 
leadership 
Institutional capacity Effective and efficient institutional structures 
Process management Agreement about process control, phasing, balance between 
content and process, and clear distribution of roles 
6.2.2 Potential financial and cooperative values at the infrastructure-land use interface  
The concept of value capture has long been intensively discussed in planning literature 
(see e.g. Rodriguez-Bachiller et al., 1992, Smolka & Amborski, 2000; Oxley, 2006; 
Alexander, 2012; Levinson & Zhao, 2012). The main argument behind the concept is that 
public action (policy change, development permissions etc.) not only leads to benefits for 
the general public and users, but also to a change in private property values, either 
positively (‘betterment’) or negatively (‘worsenment’) (Van der Krabben & Needham, 
2008; Iacono et al., 2009; Alterman, 2012). VC is concerned with regaining unearned 
betterment of private property due to positive externalities. It can be understood as an 
opposite to compensation for negative externalities (De Wolff, 2007). It is important to 
note that the concept can be operationalised in different forms: (a) as a direct mechanism 
that recoups a share of the private value increments that follow a public action or public 
works or (b) as an indirect mechanism that recovers a share of the actual costs of public 
works, regardless of property value increase (Van der Krabben & Needham, 2008; 
Alterman, 2012). 
An essential issue for VC is whether there are value gains to be captured and redistributed 
for the benefit of public investments. In integrated planning approaches, the synergy 
between interrelated land uses may lead to the emergence of added value. Holland (1998) 
explains, in abstract terms, how added value emerges from the interaction between 
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system elements. This reasoning assumes that the aggregated whole is more than the sum 
of its parts. Holland describes that such value is not present at the level of individual 
functions, but only when the systems are looked at as a coherent whole. In land use 
planning, this implies that an integrated strategy combining specific sectoral interests not 
only leads to sectoral results. It also generates values that cannot be related to a specific 
sectoral action. In less abstract terms, integration of traditionally separate spatial 
interventions (i.e. interventions in infrastructure, housing, water or nature) offers chances 
for ‘scope optimisation, with lucrative and non-cost-effective spatial investments at 
regional level linked together’ (Priemus, 2002). This implies the existence of opportunities 
for more efficient investments, potentially resulting in plans with lower costs and equal 
functionality, equal costs and higher functionality, or higher perceived value (De Jong & 
Spaans, 2009; Hijdra, 2013). Concerning investments in infrastructure, investment could 
improve not only transportation, but also the development potential of a whole area. It 
raises the accessibility of an area and ‘the image and perception of an area, thereby 
attracting additional private investment’ (Banister & Berechman, 2001).  
In addition to the financial value of VC, the application value capture mechanisms may 
be associated with other effects. An example is the potential influence on the cooperation 
between actors that are fragmented across different governmental levels and have varying 
scopes of interest (Rakers et al., 2010). These relationships have been little explored. Van 
der Veen et al. (2010) state that more distributive justice could promote joint 
‘improvement in infrastructure and other facilities in an area’. For example, redistribution 
of captured value increments can provide a source of funding for overall spatial quality 
(Van der Veen et al., 2010). Therefore, the possibility to capture and redistribute the 
additional value gains of an investment, e.g. in infrastructure, may facilitate interaction 
and joint action of actors. These actors do not necessarily have an interest in each other’s 
objectives, but expect to improve their own from the attention to overall spatial quality. 
Also, the momentum created by adequate and efficient road infrastructure developments 
may function to eventually arrive at a win-win situation, in which all actors involved 
somehow benefit from a project (Rakers et al., 2010). Getting to this beneficial situation 
incentivises cooperation for optimizing integration of separate interests. Hence, a 
potential additional effect of VC - its cooperative value - may be the enforcement of more 
open governance of institutionally fragmented interests.  
6.2.3 VC’s institutional context  
Another important topic for this study is how potential values may be captured. This issue 
touches upon the institutional side of VC. Iacono et al. (2009) distinguish different VC 
types based on the kind of coordination used to administer VC policy. Coordination can 
take the form of either compulsory measures enforced by a designated authority (i.e. 
taxation), or less formal partnerships. The taxation of unearned private value increments 
is an example of taxation, as are development obligations, i.e. allowing a public authority 
to compel private actors to complement investments for private interest with investments 
for community interests (Rodriguez-Bachiller et al., 1992; Oxley, 2006; Alexander, 2012). 
Partnerships have a voluntary or a negotiated character. Voluntary partnerships involve 
more intense cooperation between public and private actors, e.g. by actively sharing costs 
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and revenues based on development plans. Negotiated partnerships are formed in order 
to involve the passive landowners in the value capture.  
With regard to VC’s institutional context, it is also important to understand whose 
‘unearned’ property value increments are captured (Healey et al., 1995). The answer to 
this question involves a rather fundamental discussion of where unearned value 
increments end up: in the gains of private developers or in land and property values (Van 
der Krabben & Needham, 2008)? In order to make a clear distinction, this chapter slightly 
shifts the focus of this characteristic of VC to the grounds for value capturing: ownership 
or development. VC contributions can then be conceived either as a property charge on 
landowners and users, or as a charge on the profits of private developers. 
Based on the considerations above, four general VC types can be distinguished. However, 
in situations where taxation is applied as a coordinating mechanism, the application of 
VC is powerfully exercised on the contributors. Hence, in these situations it seems less 
relevant to differentiate on contribution grounds. This leaves two extreme types, 
compulsory and voluntary VC, and an intermediate type in the form of negotiated VC. In 
practice, these types are applied differently. This depends, for example, on which actor 
has an incentive for application of VC (see also table 6.2). 








1. Compulsory Taxation Landownership 
or development 
Public incentive – In addition to the realization of 
public facilities there is nothing in return. 
Compulsory capture can be enforced by 
authorities on the basis of rules and regulation, 
although conditions apply. 
2. Negotiated Partnership Landownership Private incentive – Private landowners 
participate in a negotiation about the amount of 
value that is captured. They are aware that public 
stakeholders have the capacities to capture land 
value increments in a compulsory manner. 
Before that happens a negotiation takes place to 
come to better conditions for the public and 
private parties (optimization of the agreement). 
3. Voluntary Partnership Development Public and private incentive – Private developers 
participate in VC on a voluntary basis. Capture 
takes place in return for the right to develop an 
area and serves as a way to support the 
additional public investments needed in the 
development. VC is based on the profits that 
these developers make. These are (in particular 
situations) more difficult to capture, hence an 
incentive for public stakeholders to participate. 
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Regarding the procedures that underpin these VC types in practice, a four-stage value 
capture cycle can be used to illustrate value capture processes (Huxley, 2009). Although 
different VC types should be distinguished, this process serves as the basis for practical 
application of VC. The use of a cycle shows that VC is a process, rather than just the 
capture of value increments. It also illustrates the recycling of unearned private value 
increments in publicly financed spatial projects.  
1. Value creation 
‘The unlocking of and increase in the potential value of […] land and/or structures as a 
result of public sector intervention’: such an intervention could, for example, be the 
announcement of a project or a formal change in the land use plan. The extent of value 
creation depends on the synergy effects or collaborative advantage resulting from the 
combination of different spatial functions and integrated planning. 
2. Value realisation 
‘Subsequent private [or public] investment which ensures that potential asset value 
increase is realised’: the involvement of private actors who actually invest and share risks 
or public actors that take action following the announcement or change under step 1 (e.g. 
the construction of a train station or road that improve the accessibility of a location). 
3. Value capture 
Use of ‘arrangements by the public sector for the acquisition of a proportion of [monetary 
or in-kind] private sector returns for local reinvestment’: the actual application of public 
arrangements for the extraction of private increments. VC could be in the form taxations 
or negotiated or voluntary contributions, but it may also comprehend land transfers, 
service or management agreements, or private investments in general facilities.  
4. Local value recycling 
‘The re-investment of acquired monetary or in-kind contributions from the private sector’ 
(see also literature on Cradle-to-Cradle area development: Arts & De Vaan, 2010): the 
actual redistribution of captured values for further investment. For VC that is regulated 
by legislation the purposes for which captured value can be reinvested are often included 
in legislation. For negotiated or voluntary capture there may be more freedom, although 
it may be expected that agreement on these purposes are part of the interactions that 
precede the actual capturing. 
All four stages are relevant for planning approaches that integrate major road 
infrastructure works and other land uses with a regional or local character. Stages 1 and 
2 primarily relate to interactive plan making processes and creating win-win situations. 
These stages primarily deal with the ability to cooperate. Stages 3 and 4 explicitly relate 
to the institutionalised procedures of a VC system for recouping and redistributing 
unearned value increments. 
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6.2.4 Synthesis  
The review of literature on VC and cooperation in planning indicates that, in addition to 
the financial value of VC in integrated approaches to road infrastructure and other land 
uses, a potential positive relation exists between the application of VC mechanisms and 
cooperation: the cooperative value of VC processes (see also figure 6.1).  
The implied cooperative value may facilitate the transformation in the interaction 
between fragmented actors: from hierarchical to open governance, balancing between 
competitive and argument-based cooperation. In planning at the infrastructure-land use 
interface, such a transformation seems necessary to cope with the institutional 
fragmentation of actors at this interface. Five parameters for cooperation (see also table 
6.1) can provide insight into the conditions for formulation and realisation of integrated 
aims that pay appropriate attention to the functional interrelatedness of road 
infrastructure and other land uses.  
 
Figure 6.1. A conceptual model of the relationships between different types of value capturing and 
integrated road infrastructure planning approaches: the VC-process as a means to create financial 
value as well as cooperative value 
6.3 Research approach 
6.3.1 The Netherlands as case study 
This chapter explores the relationship between different VC types and the cooperation 
among institutionally fragmented stakeholders in integrated road infrastructure projects 
by examining the Dutch infrastructure planning practice. In the Netherlands, an increased 
application of integrated strategies at the interface of major infrastructure works and other 
land uses can be observed. Moreover, Dutch planning seems to be undergoing a slow 
‘institutional revolution’ aimed at coping with high levels of functional interrelatedness 
and institutional fragmentation (see e.g. Gerrits et al., 2012). Operational programmes for 
road infrastructure and other spatial plans were merged in 2007. In 2010, the Ministry for 
Infrastructure and Transport and the Ministry for Spatial Planning merged to become the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, with the dual goal of improved efficiency 
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and reduced expenditure. In 2012, the first integrated national policy statement on 
transport and spatial planning was introduced.  
In accordance with these policy changes, planning procedures have been revised over the 
past decade. In 2011, the dedicated legislation that coordinates the Dutch planning process 
of major infrastructure works (Tracéwet) was updated. This update introduced an 
explorative stage which explores infrastructural problems in relation to other land uses, 
as well as options for integration Spatial planning legislation has undergone a 
transformation as well. In 2008, the Dutch spatial planning law (WRO) was revised to 
address the weakly proactive character of spatial planning and to improve slow and 
complex decision-making (De Wolff, 2007; Buitelaar, 2010). Comprehensive overviews of 
the institutional system for planning in the Netherlands are, for example, Needham (2014, 
from the perspective of spatial planning) and Marshall’s chapter on Dutch infrastructure 
planning (2013). 
While Dutch legislation for planning of major infrastructure works does not contain value 
capture provisions, spatial planning legislation has contained VC provisions since its 2008 
revision (GREX-legislation, see e.g. De Wolff, 2007). Recouping public investments from 
land owners is possible for municipalities, either through private law by means of 
agreements (anterior or posterior) or through public law by means of compulsory 
exploitation plans (Buitelaar, 2010). The recouped funds may however never exceed the 
initial public investment. Moreover, the recouped funds must have a direct relationship 
with the private development in terms of causality, benefit and proportionality (De Wolff, 
2007). This means that the Dutch system is first of all a system for cost recovery.  
6.3.2 Case studies 
To establish how different VC types facilitate cooperation between actors at the 
infrastructure-land use interface, we explored three integrated road infrastructure 
projects in which VC is applied. All projects have to deal with cooperation institutionally 
between fragmented actors. Each applies a different VC type: Greenportlane (compulsory 
capture, under the new legislative provisions), A59-corridor (negotiated capture) and A9-
relocation (voluntary capture). To gain insight into the cooperation between fragmented 
organisations, we looked at five parameters for cooperation, as outlined in the theoretical 
section.  
These early examples of an increasingly applied integrated planning practice were 
explored by means of a qualitative analysis. This analysis involved interviews with key 
individuals in the VC procedures and cooperation processes and archival research of 
project documentation (overall policy documents, project plans and available formal 
agreements between involved organisations). Per case study, we interviewed three 
individuals, representing the public and private stakeholders with key positions in the 
VC cycle. Moreover, to take into account the projects’ progress through the planning 
process, the interviewees and the documents used range from involvement in the very 
early phases to the current status of the projects (see Appendix 7). The interviewees were 
asked to set out their experiences regarding the cooperation between stakeholders and to 
reflect on the relation between the course of cooperation and the applied value capture 
types. The use of the VC cycle as an analytical tool allows to differentiate between pre- 
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and post-capture phases. We do not explicitly take into account the effects of the economic 
crisis on the cases: the financial effect of VC is not the main purpose of this chapter. 
Moreover, the economic crisis is too large and broad to settle with a small analysis. We do 
feel that we can assume that in all three cases VC has taken place under the same, 
worsening, economic conditions. 
6.4 Current practice: Infrastructure-land use integration in Dutch 
planning 
6.4.1 Project descriptions 
Project A: Greenportlane and Greenport area development 
Greenportlane comprises the construction of a new provincial road (5.3 km) as part of 
wider area development goals in the Venlo region. These goals are the development of a 
‘Greenport’ (5,400 ha, appr. 13,300 acres), an area for economic activity in logistics, agro-
industries (greenhouses), horticulture and manufacturing. A strategic development plan 
for the area has been developed. This plan underwrites long-term organic development 
in the area (Greenport Venlo, 2006; 2009). In 2012 the ‘Floriade’ world horticulture 
exhibition was held in the area. The exhibition resulted in the accelerated development of 
several elements such as Greenportlane. The first part of the road was constructed in the 
run-up to this event.  
Greenport is being developed by a dedicated private organisation in which four local 
municipalities participate: Greenport development company. Greenportlane has a special 
position in the Greenport project, a project manager explains: ‘From a functional-spatial 
point of view, the road is part of the wider area development goals; from an organisational 
perspective, however, the road development is a separate activity carried out by the 
province [regional infrastructure authority]’. A business case for the integrated area 
development has been made. Part of this business case is that the construction 
Greenportlane is partially financed through taxation of the owners of the surrounding 
lands (i.e. the Greenport area).  
Project B: A59-corridor and regional development strategy 
This project aims to create a viable development vision for the A59-corridor that is located 
between the cities of ‘s-Hertogenbosch and Waalwijk (ca. 20 km). The plan tackles three 
major challenges for the region (see also: Cooperating actors GOL, 2012; Bade & Smid, 
2009): 
• ‘The Green River’: a river flood protection initiative 
• ‘The Green Delta’: a programme aiming to create a coherent whole of green areas 
around the city of ‘s-Hertogenbosch 
• A59-corridor: an infrastructure project to improve several bottlenecks in and around 
highway A59 
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The aim is to promote better, faster and cheaper qualitative improvements for the region. 
An alderman mentioned that coordinated action is necessary to avoid regional stagnation 
and that ‘by approaching local issues collectively and in an integrated manner, broad 
public support is generated and, for example, the province also provides a contribution’ 
(BD, 2012). Twenty stakeholders cooperatively aim to establish innovative links between 
the development objectives concerning the A59 and the surrounding area (North Brabant, 
2013).  
Cooperation between the involved stakeholders, is based on sense-making and is strongly 
argument-based. A business case has been established, containing 25 spatial interventions 
including traffic flow measures, bridge reconstruction, floodwater storage, ecological 
corridors and recreation facilities. Although the A59 is part of the national highway 
network, the national infrastructure planning agency is not financially involved in this 
project. The A59 is not a major national priority. Since the need for the investment was 
strongly felt in the region, the region’s business community agreed to a raise of the 
property taxes to compensate the lack of national funding. 
Project C: A9 relocation and urban development 
This project comprises the relocation of a 5 km stretch of the A9 motorway in the 
Amsterdam region. The road has congestion problems, which the national infrastructure 
planning agency was planning to address through more intensive use of the same 
infrastructure (Stuurgroep A9 Badhoevedorp, 2006). Since the road divides the town of 
Badhoevedorp into two parts, local and regional authorities saw the proposed action as a 
window of opportunity to collectively address their interests (liveability, spatial quality). 
The final plan, currently in realisation, comprises relocation of the highway about 600 
meters south of the town and urban redevelopment (housing, offices and green areas) of 
the area vacated by the highway (Haarlemmermeer, 2013). 
After the initial mono-functional, traffic-oriented solution was abandoned in 2005, a 
coalition of public authorities and private actors reached an agreement on political and 
financial cooperation (Stuurgroep A9 Badhoevedorp, 2005). The core of this agreement 
was an innovative financial construction in which four layers of government and one 
private party contribute to the redevelopment of the road, in combination with urban 
development. However, the bulk of the investment is carried by the national 
infrastructure planning agency, the local municipality and the private developer. The 
infrastructure planning agency is investing the same amount as had been intended for the 
original road occupation measures, roughly half the required budget. Moreover, the area 
vacated by the highway is transferred to the local municipality free of charge. Together 
with a private developer, the local municipality will redevelop this area and invest the 
revenue in the relocation of the highway (ca. 50% of the required budget). In a voluntary 
agreement the municipality and the private developer have arranged that these funds are 
going to be recouped from the profit that the developer makes by redeveloping the 
vacated grounds.  
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Table 6.3 provides an overview of the financial stakes in the projects.  
Table 6.3. A comparative overview of project finances (based on project documentation: 
see appendix 7) 
 Greenportlane A59-corridor A9 relocation 
Cost (€1 = ca. 
0,72 GBP) 
€ 88 million € 101 million 
(approximately for total 
area development) 





- Collectively, the public 
stakeholders created a 
budget of around € 46.8 
million for the 
Greenportlane 
- Provincial 
contribution: € 20 
million 
- Municipal 
contribution: ≥ € 28.3 
million 
- Water Board 
contribution: ≥ € 3.5 
million  





€ 157 million 
- Total contribution by 
others: € 71 million 




- € 26 million expected 
to be recouped from 
land development 
revenues by the 
development company. 
This leaves a gap of 
€ 15.2 million (2008 
figures). 
- Regional 
entrepreneurs: € 15 
million. This leaves a 
gap of ≤ € 34.2 million 
(2012 figures). 
- Local municipality and 
the developer raised 
€ 90 million from area 
development revenues. 
6.4.2 Value capture cycle in practice 
To fill the gaps between cost and available budgets, all projects attempted to attract 
additional funds through capture and redistribution of created value. Exploration of 
project finances using the VC cycle provides the following insights into the creation, 
realisation, capture and redistribution of added value.  
The previous section illustrates that the projects explored paid explicit attention to the 
creation of added value by means of an integrated objective of (re)developing road 
infrastructure in combination with local land use goals. Interviewees indicate that the 
added financial value of integration is expected to be found in higher property values and 
in improved efficiency of public investments. An important distinction is the scale at 
which benefits are gained. The Greenport area is a comprehensive greenfield 
development, where area development and improved accessibility go hand in hand. 
Developments take place within the same area, at the same scale. In the case of A9 
relocation, accessibility improvements are expected at a higher (national and regional) 
scale than the local urban developments. The project A59-corridor falls somewhere in 
between, with improved accessibility expected at higher and similar scales to the regional 
area development. 
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The realisation of created value takes place in different ways. In Greenportlane, private 
regional and local businesses are expected to profit from local quality and accessibility 
improvements. These businesses are expected to move to the area during the course of 
development. For the A59-corridor, the same underlying business case seems valid, 
although private businesses are already present in the area. Furthermore, in this case 
national government does not prioritise the accessibility improvement as high as regional 
and local authorities. This means that, unlike in the other cases, not all actors with a 
functional stake have been mobilised to participate in the VC process. In the case of The 
A9 relocation, the ownership of the area for redevelopment has been transferred for free 
from the road infrastructure agency to the local municipality. The local business and 
residential community is again expected to profit from local area quality improvements. 
A private developer is involved to invest in real estate based on expected investment 
benefits. 
Although all cases take different approaches to recouping value increments, all have been 
able to persuade regional and local businesses to join, either through participation in area 
development or by making a direct financial contribution. Based on the causal 
relationship between public infrastructure provision and private property value 
increments, the Greenportlane development company has the obligation to contribute to 
the road infrastructure development (in accordance with GREX legislation). This taxation 
is eventually settled in the land prices for the businesses that are going to be the owners 
and users of the area. Initially, the development company anticipated a different kind of 
VC, aimed at longer-lasting financial partnerships between stakeholders. However, future 
landowners and users were not prepared for this. In the case of the A59, local and regional 
businesses have decided to contribute to the overall area investment, including the 
infrastructure. The business community has collectively asked public authorities to raise 
the municipal property tax. This negotiated taxation is the result of deliberation between 
the municipalities and entrepreneurs. It aims to secure a private contribution to the plans 
finances in a situation where private developments are not a part of the plan. In the case 
of the A9 relocation, benefits from the area development are recouped from the real estate 
developer by the municipality based on a private agreement. The municipality has an 
agreement with the infrastructure agency to forward recouped values for redevelopment 
of the road infrastructure. 
In all three cases, the recouped funds are reinvested in road infrastructure 
(re)development. In the Greenportlane and the A9 relocation cases, the recouped funds 
are invested directly in road infrastructure. In the case of the A59-corridor, the situation 
remains somewhat unclear, as funds have not yet been specifically earmarked. The 
recouped funds become part of the regional development budget, which includes road 
infrastructure measures.  
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Table 6.4. Value capture stages in the explored projects  
VC stages Greenportlane (N295) GOL/A59 A9 Badhoevedorp 
1. Value 
creation 
A greenfield development 
scheme creates a high 
quality and accessible 
business location 
An integrated approach 
to liveability, accessibility 
and safety enhances the 
region’s position as a 
business location 
Relocation of a highway 
allows for the 
enhancement of 
accessibility, liveability 




Regional and local 
businesses that are being 
attracted to settle in the 
area bring in new capital 
The present regional 
community considers 
development as inevitable 
to maintain its position 
and wish to contribute 
A consortium of private 
developers and the local 
municipality expect a 




Additional funds are 
expected to be recouped 
from land development 
revenues, under GREX 
legislation 
Regional businesses 
provide a negotiated 
contribution of € 15 
million 
Private developers and 
the local municipality 
contribute around € 100 









Captured values are 
reinvested in the total 
area development 
package 
Captured values are 
reinvested in relocation of 
A9 highway 
 
Table 6.4 illustrates that different VC types were applied in the cases studied. The VC in 
Greenportlane is an example of compulsory capture, since value increments are recouped 
from the owners of the land by means of taxation, as prescribed in the GREX. The 
landowners in the A59-corridor project are also subjected to VC. In this case, however, 
these owners engaged in a partnership with the developing authorities and capture is 
coordinated through private agreement. This case is an example of negotiated capture on 
the basis of landownership. Finally, the A9 case can be seen as an example of voluntary 
capture, as it is the private developer who is subjected to recouping development profits 
increments. This involves a voluntary partnership that is coordinated by private 
agreement.  
6.4.3 Cooperation parameters  
Regarding the necessary precondition of interdependent objectives, interviewees in the 
Greenportlane project indicated that interdependency of infrastructure and other land 
uses is clear. A project manager explains: ‘this greenfield development was going to be 
realised, including a plan for opening up the area for transportation. The Greenportlane 
thus was a consequence of the comprehensive area development’. In the case of the A59, 
the interdependence is also straightforward. From the beginning, planning intended to 
improve overall regional quality. For that purpose a wide array of interests, including 
interventions in the region’s road infrastructure, was necessarily pursued as a more 
efficient investment and lower planning effort. In the case of the A9, the official agreement 
between stakeholders states that ‘higher overall functionality can be better achieved by 
means of an integrated approach [relocation of infrastructure and urban development] 
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than by sole traffic optimisation measures’. In the end, improved functionality is primarily 
to be found in the urban objectives of the local authorities. The infrastructure planning 
agency, although it had a lower incentive to participate in cooperation, still participated. 
This was, partly, out of experimental curiosity for such innovative integrated 
development and cooperation.  
Secondly, with regard to understanding and respect for mutual interests, it becomes clear 
from the study that in the case of Greenportlane these factors were infrequently 
experienced. Various project managers reveal that the higher goal was soon set aside: ‘We 
had collective aims, but responsibilities were divided’. The province pursued realisation 
of the road infrastructure within a strict timeframe, whereas the development had broader 
aims concerning the whole area and a slower pace. Moreover, in the interviews, both 
infrastructure planners and spatial planners, expressed that they often felt a lack of respect 
from the other actors for their interests, due to their different frames of reference. In the 
case of the A59, where a win-win situation was pursued, understanding and respect for 
mutual interests were explicit points of departure in plan development. ‘Every actor 
should always be able to recognise his own interests within the wider plan’, explains a 
project manager. Similarly, in the A9 case the ‘will to keep on searching and exploring the 
possibility to achieve someone else’s interests without losing your own’ was essential in 
the early phases, according to an interviewed project manager. 
Thirdly, considering cooperation as a human effort reveals the practical consequences of 
a lack of shared goals in the Greenportlane project. Interviewed project managers describe 
a situation with different perceptions of the purpose of the planning process. An 
interviewee illustrates: ‘People with knowledge of asphalt and concrete had to interact 
with people who were working on abstract visions about the structure of the area and 
who were creating added value through the logistic accessibility and design of the area’. 
This mismatch caused miscommunications and low trust among the people working on 
the project within the various organisations. A project manager from the A59 case pointed 
out that in that project ‘trust is written in capital letters’. It appeared one of the crucial 
factors in the further specification of the goals. Finally, an A9 project manager revealed 
that cooperation between actors involved in that case was characterised by transparency, 
which facilitated a constructive dynamics. Furthermore, the courage shown within this 
project by the local municipality to substantially contribute was greatly appreciated by 
the national road infrastructure planning agency and has further promoted the collective 
enthusiasm. 
Fourthly, the absence of an appropriate institutional framework seems to have been 
another crucial factors for the cumbersome cooperation around Greenportlane. Project 
managers question the fragmentation of responsibilities: ‘To avoid [conflicts between] the 
multitude of interests, it would have been more efficient to have the development 
company responsible for the plan as whole, including the road’. Furthermore, an agenda 
of requirements was never determined and the project only had a cooperation agreement 
that was very operational, mainly intended to arrange the project finances. In the A59 and 
A9 cases, project organisation seem to have been more efficient, with signed cooperation 
agreements, institutionalised structures for political deliberations, as well as structures for 
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the preparation of these deliberations (Stuurgroep A9 Badhoevedorp, 2006; Cooperating 
actors GOL, 2012). 
Finally, with regard to process management, the lack of a signed cooperation agreement 
in the Greenportlane case led to uncertainty and disagreement about vision and goals, 
responsibilities and finances. It seems to have caused many of the conflicts described 
above: ‘we were planning without a clear framework and thus without knowing whether 
the plan would fit the purpose and vision’, a project manager revealed. In the A59 and A9 
cases, these formal agreements form solid foundations for fruitful and transparent 
cooperation, collaboratively making successive steps by indicating the purpose, interests 
and approaches, and the financial responsibilities of the parties. 
6.5 Analysis: Influence of VC on multilevel cooperation 
In our explorations, a compulsory type of VC, coordinated through taxation of 
landownership, is associated with low or even counterproductive cooperation between 
actors. In the explored case (Greenportlane), the institutional capacity for cooperation has 
been low due to diverging interests and goals. This resulted in cumbersome interactions 
between the provincial authorities responsible for the infrastructure, and the development 
company responsible for the wider area development. It is only the strong functional 
interdependency of road infrastructure and other land uses within this comprehensive 
greenfield development that suits the legal preconditions for capture of created value.  
A project manager stated that this ‘conventional’ type of mechanism for capturing and 
redistributing value ‘is safe and requires the least effort’. Due to the cumbersome 
cooperation, partnership based VC never became feasible in this project. Essentially, the 
effort for creating the required partnership between stakeholders for application of other 
VC types appeared too high. Moreover, the application of a compulsory VC type seems 
not to have intensified cooperation later on. 
On the basis of our explorations, negotiated business cases could be associated with closer 
forms of cooperation. However, in the A59-corridor project case, where the regional 
business community provided a financial contribution for the improvement of the 
region’s overall social, economic and environmental qualities, the application of this 
innovative VC mechanism seems to have only slightly enhanced cooperation between the 
public and private actors represented in the regional coalition. Interdependency, shared 
aims and a shared organisation and process already characterised the interactions 
between partners in this coalition in the stages before the actual capture of created value. 
In addition to that, a project manager mentions, the negotiated VC type seems to have 
improved the clarity of involved organisations’ interests for the other participating 
organisations: ‘To have your own interests served [within the shared business case], 
everyone’s interests needed to be clear to the others and respected as such’.  
Rather, this exploration of negotiated value capture illustrates that interdependence, 
awareness of it and a clear and shared development aim, established through intensive 
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cooperation, can provide a solid foundation for the application of VC. A project manager 
explained the regional business community’s awareness of the interdependency of 
mutual interests like this: ‘It is important that the A59 is free of traffic jams, but if the local 
business community wishes to continue attracting employees in the long run, the region’s 
liveability is equally important’. Another project manager indicated that due to necessity 
and the broadly shared aims in the plan, ‘the additional revenue that will be made through 
adoption of the plan is clear to the regional business community in such a way that the 
public effort to raise a private contribution of € 15 million was only minor’. Finally, a 
project manager revealed that the business community’s willingness to contribute was 
further enlarged by the broad coalition of public actors and the human effort of several 
individuals in this project: ‘Inspiring local leadership has been crucial in creating the 
required regional public support and in convincing local private actors of the potential 
value that is created through the integrated aims’. 
The voluntary type of value capturing that we explored lastly illustrates a reciprocal 
relationship between VC and cooperation. In the A9 case, with the private developer and 
municipality as contributors in a partnership situation, application of VC has contributed 
to a solid foundation for further cooperation. Moreover, open and professional 
cooperation between public organisations were also a basis for capture and redistribution 
of added value. The application of a VC mechanism has enabled national infrastructure 
authorities to participate in this integrated approach to infrastructural issues and local 
liveability concerns. As such, the partnership-based business case under a voluntary VC 
mechanism appeared a basis for continuing the open cooperation in this case. Based on a 
considerable financial foundation (50% contribution to the required budget by the local 
municipality and the private developer, and free transfer of ownership of the former 
infrastructure site) the national infrastructure providers and the local and regional actors 
were able to establish a constructive institutional structure for further development of 
their shared goals. ‘Everyone’s participation was based on their own interests, which is 
important. But, without cutting back on our own interests, we were all willing to explore 
how other interests could be served’, a project manager emphasises understanding of 
mutual interest and constructive group dynamics as consequences of the redistribution of 
finance.  
The local municipality’s courageous leadership in making such a substantial commitment 
aroused the interest of the other participants to further pursue this innovative financial 
construction. ‘It has been very important that the local municipality was willing to take a 
certain risk with the integrated goals and intention to contribute half of the required 
investment. This was very convincing and was greatly appreciated, at least to the national 
infrastructure planning agency’. Hence, in this case there seems to be a reciprocal 
relationship between cooperation and value capture: application of VC and redistribution 
of values to promote interdependency, strengthen the ensuing cooperative process at the 
infrastructure-land use interface. At the same time, interdependency, the municipality’s 
courageous attitude, shared goals and transparency all were preconditions for the 
application of the VC mechanisms in this project’s innovative business case. 
A positive relation between VC and cooperation is recognizable in partnership-based 
applications of VC. This relation appears to be related to the explication of value in 
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integrated projects that takes place in VC processes. In the early stages of the VC-process, 
open cooperation allows for a thorough discussion and exploration of interests between 
functionally interrelated, but institutionally fragmented actors. From such discussions the 
potential becomes clear for synergies between infrastructure and other land uses. 
Eventually, financial exploitation of these synergy values could be an incentive for VC.  
This positive relation is not observed in interactions that take place around taxation as VC 
type. The interviewees in the Greenportlane case explained that VC was applied in a 
situation that lacked cooperation in the early stages of the process. In this uncooperative 
process, potential synergies were not made explicit and the participants did not develop 
a sense for a business case based on partnership. In the later stages of the value capture 
process (capture and redistribution of value), the applied taxation provided no incentive 
to move away from hierarchical coordination.  
6.6 Conclusions 
The point of departure for our qualitative explorations was the hypothetical expectation 
that, in addition to the financial value of VC, value capturing may also have cooperative 
value. Our empirical study and analysis lead us to the conclusion that the application of 
VC could indeed be an incentive for cooperation between infrastructure providers and 
actors involved in regional or local land use planning. Particularly the later stages in VC 
processes, value capture and value redistribution, have the capacity to strengthen 
interactions between fragmented actors and to overcome problems with institutional 
fragmentation.  
However, a more nuanced look at our findings reveals that the relation between VC and 
cooperation between fragmented actors should be seen as a reciprocal relationship, rather 
than a cause-effect relationship (see also figure 6.2). Cooperation can be regarded a 
precondition for application of VC. In particular for the first two stages in VC processes: 
value creation and realisation.  
These positive relations are not encountered in all types of VC. Especially the applied 
coordination mechanism seems to be an influential factor. A positive relation is observed 
in the cases between partnership-based VC and cooperation, whereas this positive 
relation is not observed in interactions that take place around taxation as VC type 
(illustrated at the top of figure 6.2). The differences in possible contribution grounds seem 
to be of less relevance. 
The case studies provide strong indications that the positive relationship between the 
partnership-based VC types and cooperation between fragmented actors may be 
attributed to several cooperation parameters. In the early stages, parameters such as 
awareness of interdependence, understanding of mutual interests and human efforts may 
establish the required preconditions for viable application of VC (figure 6.2, left side, 
upper box). In later stages, when values are captured and redistributed, an established 
shared business case and official agreements may help to maintain conditions for 
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cooperation, by explicating and institutionalizing the interdependency of the involved 
organisations (figure 6.2, left side, lower box). 
 
Figure 6.2. The reciprocal relation between various cooperative values of VC in integrated road 
infrastructure planning: cooperative values are a precondition, as well as a benefit of negotiated or 
voluntary VC processes 
Here it must be mentioned that the additional efforts for enhancing cooperation should, 
at a certain point, be expected to outweigh the additional benefits of cooperation. To avoid 
unviable efforts for enhancing cooperation, it may be interesting to study the interactions 
between actors in VC-processes from a transaction cost-perspective (see e.g. Zajac & 
Olsen, 1993). 
Although this chapter focuses strongly on the Netherlands, the findings are also 
interesting from an international perspective. Our explorations show how cooperation of 
fragmented actors helps to make potential synergy values explicit and exploitable. 
Through facilitation of cooperation between institutionally fragmented actors a different 
approach to dealing with interrelatedness of land uses becomes feasible. Central to this 
approach is a proactive focus on the exploitation of the positive effects of interrelatedness, 
rather than on reactively mitigating its negative consequences. This transformation fits a 
trend towards more cooperative, bottom-up, localised and durable modes of planning, 
financing, such as piecemeal organic development (Janssen-Jansen et al., 2012; RLI, 2014).  
The observed mechanisms in this chapter are based on in-depth observation of three cases 
that are first experiences from a rather specific context. In the pursuit of general 
recommendations for dealing with the issue of functional interrelatedness and 
institutional fragmentation, it is essential to take the diversity of institutional planning 
contexts into account. Moreover, validating the relationships found, requires further 
research that links a classification of VC types to cooperation parameters in a more 
quantitative way.   
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